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TIME WITHOUT CREATION?
Alexander Pruss and Joshua Rasmussen

We introduce three arguments for the thesis that time cannot exist prior to
an original creation event. In the first argument, we seek to show that if time
doesn’t depend upon creation, then time is infinite in the backwards direction, which is incompatible with arguments for a finite past. In the second and
third arguments, we allow for the possibility of backwards-infinite time but
argue that God could not have a sufficiently good reason to refrain from creating for infinitely many moments—either in a world void of created things
(argument two) or in the actual world prior to creation (argument three). Our
end goal is to help clarify connections between time and divine action.

1. Introduction
Contemporary discussions of God’s relationship to time tend to focus on
the question of whether God can exist without time.1 We flip the question: can time exist without God’s creation? We’ll give three arguments for
thinking not.
To focus our discussion, we will make a few preliminary assumptions about God and time. First, we will assume for the sake of argument
that (i) time is real (though we’ll remain neutral about the metaphysics
of time—about whether time is absolute or relational, static or dynamic,
continuous or discrete, and so on). Without (i), the question of whether
time could exist without God’s creation loses much of its interest.2 Second,
we will suppose that (ii) time has an intrinsic metric by which different
lengths of time can be distinguished. Stipulatively, we use the term “time”
as shorthand for “metric time” and treat non-metric “time” as a species
of timelessness.3 Third, we will suppose that (iii) creation has occurred a
1
See, for example, Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1970); Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981),
429–458; Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); William
Lane Craig, God, Time and Eternity (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2001); Louis Caruana,“God’s Eternity and Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity,” Revista
Portuguesa de Filosofia 61 (2005), 89–112; and Paul Helm, Eternal God: a Study of God without
Time, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2
Of course, one could imagine a view on which in fact time is unreal, but time could have
been real, and then it would still make sense to ask whether time could have been real without
God’s creation. But no one advocates such a view, as far as we are aware.
3
Thus, the metric-less view of divine eternity that’s come out of Oxford is not a target of
our paper. Our question is whether metric time can exist prior to creation. For a discussion of

pp. 401–411

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 31 No. 4 October 2014
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201412819
All rights reserved

Faith and Philosophy

402

finite amount of time ago, i.e., there is a finite amount of time N such that
it is false that there were any created things more than N units of time ago.
Thesis (iii) is a view about creation common to the three major Western
monotheistic religions; thus, its ontological implications will be of broad
interest to philosophers of religion. (We do not suppose that God must
create a finite time ago—only that God in fact did, if there is a God who
created at all.) Fourth, we will stipulate that (iv) “created things” include
anything caused by God, including divine thoughts or other immaterial
events. Finally, with respect to one argument we will make use of the classical conception of God according to which (v) God could have refrained
from creation. The target of our critique, then, is this: there can be time
prior to a creation moment, assuming a classical understanding of God
and a minimal understanding of time as expressed by (i)–(v). Call that
thesis “Time Uncreated.” Our goal is to get on the table three arguments
against Time Uncreated.
The denial of Time Uncreated, conjoined with the claim that God is
eternal, gives one good reason to think that God’s eternality is not just
everlastingness but also or instead a timeless eternality.
2. Argument One
The outline of our first argument, which we call “The Simple Argument,”
is as follows:
(1) If Time Uncreated is true, then time has no beginning.
(2) Time has a beginning.
(3) Therefore, Time Uncreated is not true.
The thesis that time has a beginning simply means that time does not
extend infinitely into the past. (A finite past is compatible with the nonexistence of a first moment, as per some interpretations of Big Bang
cosmology on which the backwards time sequence forms an interval that’s
open on its lower end.4)
Consider, first, premise (1): if Time Uncreated is true, then time has no
beginning. Suppose the antecedent is true. Then time exists prior to and
so independent from creation. And if it exists independent from creation,
then it plausibly exists independent from any event. (Recall our preliminary assumption that “created things” include anything caused by God,
including divine thoughts or other immaterial events.) It’s plausible, then,
that if time exists independent from creation, then time is an independent
substance or reality.

metric-less “time,” see, for example, Alan Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1992), 122–146 and Richard Swinburne, “God and Time,” in Reasoned
Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 204–222.
4
See, for example, Adolf Grünbaum, “The Pseudo-problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology,” Philosophy of Science 56 (1989), 373–394.
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So, suppose that time is an independent substance or reality. Then
nothing causes time to begin, since time exists independently of all causal
events. Moreover, if time is an independent reality, then time doesn’t in
any way depend (either metaphysically or causally) upon events. So plausibly, dependence goes the other way: events depend upon time. After all,
one cannot have events without time, and a plausible explanation of this
observation is that one depends on the other. If that is right, then there
cannot be an event in which time itself has a beginning, since such an event
would seem to presuppose (depend upon) the existence of time. The result
is that if time is an independent reality that exists ontologically prior to all
events, then time has no beginning.
Premise (1) also has the backing of history. The usual views about
time throughout history have depicted time as either an independent,
beginning-less reality or as an “ordering” of events that is itself dependent
upon causation or change. The second option implies that time does not
precede creation, since prior to creation there was no causation or change.
So, on the usual views of time, if time does precede creation, then time is
an independent, beginning-less reality.
Someone may be able to devise a sophisticated theory of time that is
inconsistent with premise (1). For example, suppose (a) time exists of necessity, (b) time necessarily has a first instant, and (c) necessarily, it takes
God some time before deciding whether or not to create. Then (1) is false
because time would precede creation even while time has a beginning.5
On the other hand, the preceding considerations reveal a tension
between (a) and (b). For suppose time exists of necessity. Then time is
plausibly an independent substance or reality: its existence doesn’t depend upon the obtaining of any antecedent conditions or events. In that
case, dependence plausibly goes the other way: events depend upon time.
Then, as we suggested, the event of time’s beginning (assuming that counts
as an event) depends upon time, resulting in an unhappy circle of dependence. Moreover, even if one avoids circular dependence (perhaps by
denying that time’s beginning counts as an event, or by denying that there
is a dependence relation between time and events), one may still wonder
why time that necessarily exists would necessarily have a beginning. Such
a beginning would presumably not involve a transition from a state of no
time, since a state of no time is impossible if time’s existence is necessary.
So the beginning of time would instead mark a temporal edge that doesn’t
itself come into being. But then why wouldn’t this edge of time be part of
God’s creation? It may even seem that if time has an edge, then time is a
substance of some sort, and that this substance, like all substances other
than God, would be part of God’s creation. (We’ll have more to say about
time as a created substance in the next section.) These considerations aren’t
conclusive, of course, but they do reveal obstacles to a theory of time and
5
We thank an anonymous referee for pressing this theory as a conceptually possible alternative.
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creation that is inconsistent with (1). Anyone who would overcome those
obstacles would have a way to escape our argument. Our aim is to note
the obstacles, since learning that Time Uncreated requires a new and very
unusual theory of time and creation is significant in its own right.
Turn next to premise (2), which says that time has a beginning. Premise
(2) is sure to be more controversial than premise (1). However, rather than
attempt to give a rigorous defense of the premise, we shall summarize one
recent philosophical argument for it, and then we will move on to arguments that do not require this premise.6
Here is an argument given by Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons for
thinking that time has a beginning.7 The argument aims to show that if the
past were infinite, then, given certain independently plausible “recombination” principles, absurd combinations of events could result. Here is a
simple version of the argument. Jim is alive at noon on January 1, 2015,
and the only way he can die that day is at the hand of a Grim Reaper (GR).
A GR is an entity that is programmed by a GR factory to awaken at a time
exclusively between noon and 1 pm on January 1, 2015. The GR checks
whether Jim is alive at its wakeup time, and if he is, it instantly (or sufficiently quickly8) kills him. Otherwise, it goes back to sleep without doing
anything harmful to anyone.
There is nothing incoherent about there being a GR. But suppose that
an infinite past is possible. Then it should likewise be possible for a GR
to have come into existence on the first of January of every past year.
After all, if a GR can come into existence at some time, then there doesn’t
seem to be any impossibility in GRs coming into existence at any other
times: imagine a factory churning out GRs, one per year. Furthermore,
any combination of pre-programmed wake-up times should be possible.
Suppose, then, that we are in a world where a GR came into existence
on every January 1 during an infinite past. Moreover, the one that came
into existence this year was programmed to wake up at 30 minutes past
noon. The one that came into existence last year was programmed for 15
minutes past noon. The one that came into existence two years ago was
6
Other, older arguments for a finite past include arguments against an actual infinity of
things (see William Lane Craig and James Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,”
in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. J. P. Moreland and W. L. Craig [Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012], 106–116), the argument against traversing an infinite sequence
(Ibid., 117–125), and arguments against an infinity of contingently ordered things (Moreland,
“A Response to a Platonistic and Set-theoretic Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 39 [2004], 373–390). For critical discussions, see W. Morriston, “Must
Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?” Faith and Philosophy 20 (2003), 288–306, and Graham
Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
7
Alexander Pruss, “From the Grim Reaper Paradox to the Kalam Argument,” http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2009/10/from-grim-reaper-paradox-to-kalaam.html (October 2,
2009), and Robert Koons, “A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper,” Noûs 48,
no. 2 (2012), 256–267.
8
We might suppose that it does the killing within one second, and if another GR wakes
up during that second, then this second GR notices that the first one is busy killing Jim and
goes back to sleep.
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programmed for 7.5 minutes past noon. And so on, so that each GR was
programmed to wake up closer to noon than the one to be created next. All
of this should be possible assuming there can be an infinite past, it seems.
But we now encounter a perplexing question: what will happen to
Jim on January 1, 2015? He will certainly be dead by 1 pm, since all the
GRs will wake up strictly between noon and 1 pm, and each GR is programmed to kill Jim as soon as it wakes up, assuming Jim hasn’t already
been killed by a GR. Which GR kills Jim? The culprit will have to be the
first GR to wake up, since any GR that isn’t first to wake up will be too late
to kill Jim—a previous GR would have to already be the killer. Thus, the
GR story entails that there is a first GR to wake up. But there isn’t, since
every GR wakeup is preceded by an earlier GR wakeup. So, there both is
and is not a first GR to wake up.
Therefore, the GR story is impossible. But why is it impossible? A very
reasonable explanation is that it is impossible precisely because it is impossible to have an infinite past.
3. Argument Two
Here is our second argument against Uncreated Time:
(1) Possibly, God refrains from ever creating anything.
(2) It is not possible for God to refrain from creating over an infinite
duration of time.
(2) Therefore, it is possible for time to be finite or non-existent. (1, 2)
(4) If it is possible for time to be finite or non-existent, then time is not
an independently existing reality.
(5) If time is not an independently existing reality, then time depends
upon creation.
(6) Therefore, time depends upon creation: Uncreated Time is not true.
(3–5)
Let us consider each premise in turn. Premise (1) falls out of the classical
understanding of God as having aseity, i.e., being a completely self-sufficient being. A truly supreme being would be perfectly self-sufficient, one
might think, and therefore would not need to create anything. On this view
God could exist alone. Some non-traditional theists may reject this conception of God, but our goal is to see what we can infer about the nature
of time on the classical view of God—per preliminary assumption (v). So,
we will assume the classical view here for the sake of argument.
Premise (2) says that it is not possible for God to refrain from creating
over an infinite duration of time. To help us think about this premise, let
us first suppose that God experiences time as a sequence of events. Try
to imagine what it might be like to live through an infinite amount of time
without ever doing anything. (We will come back to the option that God
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does not experience time as a sequence of events.) It seems that the only
reason a being like God might have for refraining from creation is that
God is impressed by certain values, such as the simplicity of a maximally
empty world or the value of there being nothing in reality that falls short
of maximal greatness. Observe, however, that the value of simplicity is
significantly reduced if time must exist besides God anyway. This is especially so if there are infinitely many distinct times. Consider, furthermore,
that time is something that falls short of maximal greatness (since time
is not God). So, it doesn’t seem God could be motivated to refrain from
creation for infinite time by the value of there being nothing in reality that
falls short of maximal greatness. What then might motivate God to refrain
from creating throughout infinite time?
Consider again what it might be like to experience infinitely many moments. God is completely unchanging,9 moment after moment, forever. It is
one thing for God to simply refrain from creating anything, including time
and space. It is a different thing entirely for God to refrain from creating
throughout infinite time. A continual, endless state of maximal simplicity
may seem to be extraordinarily uninteresting—maybe even painfully
boring. Simplicity itself may be a value, but it is far less clear that keeping
things simple forever is a value. Why keep things so simple for so long?
Of course, God may have a very rich inner-life. And the richness of
that life may allow God to be perfectly content not to create anything.
Someone may wonder, for example, whether God enjoys internal loving
relations among, say, the divine persons of a Trinity. Note, though, that
these loving relations would be completely static across infinitely many
distinct moments of time: no new thoughts or expressions of love would
ever occur, and God would endure this static existence forever. Could the
best possible being really prefer such a situation? Could God be motivated
to remain uncreative and unchanging moment after moment forever? We
suspect that at least some philosophers will find affirmative answers implausible, though reasonable disagreement here is certainly possible.10
Our goal is to merely mark out one pathway toward premise (2) that some
philosophers will find attractive.
Now, suppose instead that God does not experience time as a sequence
of events. Then there is reason to think that time is not a necessary reality. Here is why. Consider first that if God doesn’t experience time as a
9
As noted earlier, we count any events generated by God, even divine thoughts, as part of
“creation.” One may resist this assumption, however, if one denies that divine thoughts (in
sequence) are events caused by God.
10
Someone of a Molinist persuasion could perhaps argue that the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can be such that there are no feasible worlds open to God in which there are
creatures worth creating. For instance, perhaps no creatable creature would freely do any
good or enough good in any world in which time is infinite. In that case, God may prefer to
refrain from creating forever. Although the feasibility of the actual world may suggest that
the counterfactuals of freedom aren’t that undesirable, perhaps they could be—in which case
God would be motivated to refrain from creating forever. We thank an anonymous referee
for bringing this possibility to our attention.
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sequence of events in the creation-less world, then God either is timeless
or experiences time “all at once” in that world. Both options imply the
falsity of a certain presentist theory of time (at the creation-less world) that
says that whatever exists presently exists.11 For on this presentist theory, if
God exists, then God presently exists and so exists in time; moreover, God
doesn’t experience all times at once, since there is ever only one time that is
actual—namely, whatever time is present.12 So the first observation is that
if God does not experience time as a sequence of events, then a version of
presentism is false.
The above observation is significant because if this version of presentism is instead true, then we can explain why there is time in the
world in which God doesn’t create: there is time there just because there
is something there—namely, God. If, on the other hand, presentism is not
true, then it is not so clear why time should exist in the world where God
doesn’t create anything. If, for example, time is a dimension of a space-time
manifold, then it seems that time would be part of creation.13 On the usual
non-presentist views, time is a substance or a dimension of a substance
(space-time), and although there are theistic philosophers who hold that
abstract entities like numbers and properties exist without being created
by God,14 no one who esteems divine aseity holds that (concrete15) substances exist without being created by God. Here is the point: it seems that
unless temporal existence is entailed by sheer existence (as per presentism),
time does not exist in the world in which God doesn’t create anything. So,
if God doesn’t experience time as a sequence of events (because temporal
existence is not entailed by sheer existence), then time is possibly nonexistent. And if time is possibly non-existent, then we can skip to step (3),
which says that possibly, time is finite or non-existent.

11
It is also incompatible with the view that there is no meaningful of sense of “exists” that
is semantically distinguishable from “presently exists.” For a discussion of this so-called
“very serious tenser” view, see Thomas Crisp, “On Presentism and Triviality,” Oxford Studies
in Metaphysics 1 (2004), 15–20.
12
So Alston’s theory that God experiences an eternal present implies that the version of presentism in question is false, if his theory implies that God experiences all times at once. See
William Alston, “Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media,” in Existence and Actuality, ed. John
B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 91.
13
Cf. Leftow, Time and Eternity, 275, and Dean Zimmerman, “God Inside Time and Before
Creation,” in God and Time, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle and David M.Woodruff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 85.
14
See Nicholas Wolterstorff, On Universals: An Essay in Ontology (Chicago and London:
The. University of Chicago Press, 1970).
15
On substantivalist views of time, time seems more akin to concrete entities than to
abstract entities. On relativity theory, spacetime has geometrical properties that evolve dynamically. Things that evolve dynamically are concrete. Thus spacetime is concrete. Thus, in
the world where God creates nothing, there is no spacetime. But time-without-space seems
to be simply a limiting case of spacetime, a case where instead of, say, three spatial and
one temporal dimension, there is just one temporal dimension. We would thus expect the
time-without-space to be concrete in the way spacetime is, and so time would be concrete,
whether married to space or not.
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So, to review, in the world where God doesn’t create, God must either
endure infinitely many moments, or else there is plausibly no (metric) time
there at all. If we take the first option, we face the difficulty of explaining
why God might wish to endure so much time without ever creating anything. Premise (2) avoids that difficulty. The other option implies step (3).
So, either way, we can proceed to (3).
The next premise is (4): if possibly time is finite or non-existent, then
time is not an independently existing reality. The thought here is that if
time were an independently existing reality, then time would not be the
sort of thing that could begin to exist or fail to exist depending upon the
circumstances. Time would be a necessary substance (or a necessary byproduct of existence per the presentism discussed above). The theories of
time that philosophers have entertained imply that time is either a necessarily existing reality or that it is dependent in some way on change or
causation.16 We don’t see a plausible alternative.
Turn, finally, to premise (5). Premise (5) says that if time is not an independently existing reality, then time depends upon creation. We have
already offered motivation for this premise. The basic idea is that if time is
dependent in nature, then it depends upon causation or change (or both);
at least those have been the standard options. So, since both causation and
change are included in any creation event, we infer that if time is dependent, it plausibly depends upon creation.
From all these premises, it follows that Uncreated Time is false. Note
that this argument does not require the premise that there was a first moment of creation.
4. Argument Three
Our third and final argument against Uncreated Time builds upon ideas
expressed by Augustine17 and proceeds as follows:
(1) If Uncreated Time is true, then time has no beginning.
(2) If time has no beginning and God is in time, then God waited an
infinite amount of time before creating.
(3) If time has no beginning and God is not in time, then God arbitrarily chose one time out of an infinite sequence of on-par times to
create in.
(4) God didn’t wait an infinite amount of time before creating.
(5) God didn’t arbitrarily choose one time out of an infinite sequence
of on-par times to create in.
16
Aristotle’s option that time is both (i) a byproduct of change and (ii) necessarily existent
(because necessarily, there is an eternal changing universe) is not relevant since it is incompatible with our supposition that God did not need to create.
17
See, for instance, Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New
York: Image Books, Doubleday, 1960), 284–285.
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(6) God is in time or God is not in time.
(7) Therefore, Uncreated Time is not true.
We’ve seen premise (1) before. In support of it, we argued that if time
exists independently of creation, then time can’t begin to exist wholly uncaused.
Premise (2) says that if (metric) time has no beginning and God is in
time, then God waited an infinite amount of time before creating. The idea
here is that God is not the sort of being that can come into existence or go
out of existence: God is eternal. Therefore, if God is in time, and if time has
no beginning, then God’s experience of time has no beginning. In effect,
God has been “waiting” from all of eternity to create something.
Premise (3) says that if time has no beginning and God is not in time,
then God arbitrarily chose one time out of an infinite sequence of on-par
times to create in. This premise is motivated by the observation that empty
times are intrinsically alike. Furthermore, prior to God’s decision to create
anything at a particular time, all times are also extrinsically alike (assuming
the immutability of God’s eternal thoughts18). So, there is nothing about
any particular time itself that could serve as a basis for God to have a
reason to create at that time. Thus, every time is “on-par.”
Consider, next, premise (4): God didn’t wait an infinite amount of time
before creating. This premise could be motivated by something like the
“boredom argument” we saw earlier. If God has to literally wait an infinite
amount of time to do something He wants to do, then it seems God had
better have a good reason to do so. We are suggesting that God could not
be sufficiently motivated to delay creation for infinite time if God experiences the passage of time.19 The situation is even more extreme because
God is intent on creating, yet God chooses to undergo an infinitely long
waiting period before carrying out that intention. It seems hard to see
what good reason there would be to refrain that long.
Moreover, one should avoid theories that presuppose an extremely
unlikely sequence of events if there is an alternative. But the view that
God waited an infinite amount of time presupposes an extremely unlikely
sequence of events, namely an infinite sequence of past moments at which
God did not decide to create. And there is an alternative to this unlikely
hypothesis, namely that time depends on creation. (We will return to the
issue of how likely it is that God creates at any one particular time.)
Next is premise (5): God didn’t arbitrarily choose one time out of an
infinite sequence of on-par times to create in. One strategy for supporting
this premise is a Leibnizian argument, discussed by Leftow, that God
would lack an adequate reason to create at one time rather than another,
18
Recall, again, that we are including any new thoughts that God might have as part of
“creation.”
19
There is a related argument that God must have a good reason for creating when He did
rather than sooner. See Leftow, “Why Didn’t God Create the World Sooner?” Religious Studies
27 (1991), 157–172, and Craig, God, Time and Eternity, 153–156, 181–182.
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given infinite time.20 Plausibly, God doesn’t choose for no reason at all: such
choosing is not in keeping with supreme rational agency. Yet, it is far from
clear how there could be a rational reason for God to prefer one time over
another.
Someone might reply, however, that God could choose a time either on
the basis of its unique haecceity or in order to create particular individuals
whose origins are essentially tied down to particular times. The first option implies that times have haecceities, and that out of love for a time
with a particular haecceity, God creates then. The second (and surely more
plausible) scenario is that if an individual x comes into existence at t0, then
x could not have come into existence at any other time. God then chooses
to create at t0 because he wants these particular individuals to come into
existence, and they can’t have come into existence if God creates at any
other time.
Alternatively, someone might reply that some choices, such as in
a Buridan’s ass scenario, could be made in the absence of reasons that
privileged one choice over another. The idea here is that if a rational agent
is faced with intrinsically indistinguishable options, the agent might be
able to simply choose an option without having any specific reason for
choosing that option rather than any other.
Instead of becoming entrenched in deep and difficult debates about
rational agency, we will raise a different, “probability-based” motivation
for premise (5). Suppose there are infinitely many times prior to creation.
Then there should be an equal objective probability of God beginning to
create during any given year: all times are intrinsically alike (“on par”),
after all. Now let Cn be the event of God beginning to create in year n
(according to some fixed numbering system). Then creation events prior
to Cn all have equal probability p. Furthermore, this probability cannot
be a positive real number. For suppose p is a positive real number. Then
there will be an integer N such that N . p > 1. But then P(C– 1 or C– 2 or … or
C– N) = N . p by finite additivity; hence, we have an event whose probability
exceeds 1, which is impossible. So p is either zero or infinitesimal.
Suppose p = 0 or infinitesimal. And suppose, first, that probabilities
satisfy countable additivity. Then the probability that God creates in some
year or other will also be zero or infinitesimal. But surely the objective
probability that God creates in some year or other is non-zero—God is not
that unlikely to create something rather than nothing.
If, on the other hand, probabilities do not satisfy countable additivity,
then all sorts of absurdities follow due to failure of conglomerability.21 For
instance, one can set up cases where a rational agent will become infinitesimally short of certain, or in fact 100 percent certain, that a fair coin came
Leftow, Time and Eternity.
For a discussion of conglomerability, as well as an argument that failures of it are not
such a terrible thing, see Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga, and John Hawthorne, “Bayesianism,
Infinite Decisions, and Binding,” Mind 113 (2004), 251–283.
20
21
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up tails just by doing some probability calculations. Suppose, for example,
I flip a coin. If it’s heads, I’ll do a non-conglomerable infinite lottery on
the natural numbers, such that each particular outcome has infinitesimal
or zero probability. Such a lottery can be seen as a model of the situation
in which God chooses between an infinite number of on par years.22 If the
coin comes up tails, I’ll do a different kind of lottery on the naturals: 1
has probability 1/2, 2 has probability 1/4, and so on. I will then announce
the lottery outcome to you. Let us say I announce 10 to you as the outcome. What should your credence in heads be? Well, P (10 | heads) is 0
or infinitesimal, whereas P (10 | tails) = 1/1024, which is infinitely many
times greater. So I have extremely strong evidence of tails—no matter what
number is announced. Therefore, by Van Fraassen’s reflection principle,23 I
should predict tails before you announce any result to me. But that surely
isn’t right, since heads should come up 50 percent of the time.24 Hence,
basic probabilistic reasoning falls apart—unless there is a privileged (intrinsically more likely) time for creation (such as the first time).
Finally, there is premise (6): God is in time or God is not in time. That
follows from our starting assumption that God and time are both real,
together with the law of excluded middle.
The premises jointly entail that Uncreated Time is not true: that is, there
cannot be time prior to creation.
5. Conclusion
We have introduced three new arguments against the theory that time can
exist prior to creation. One argument—the Simple Argument—depends
upon the premise that time has a beginning, whereas the others are compatible with the existence of an infinite past. These arguments are opening
gambits in a quest to better understand the nature of time and its relationship to creation. If successful, they show that God’s relationship to time
is voluntary on God’s part, insofar as creation is voluntary, since without
creation there is no time.
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